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MEDIA RITUALS: BEYOND FUNCTIONALISM 
NICK COULDRY 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past decade, a consensus has begun to emerge behind a new approach to media 
research that escapes the confines of earlier media studies.1 This new approach seeks 
to work not just on the level of media texts and institutions, but on the broader and 
more subtle ways in which the very existence of media in our societies transforms 
them, for good or ill. If Joshua Meyrowitz’s (1994) term ‘medium theory’ smacks too 
much of technological determinism, a better label for this shift is ‘mediation’:2 what 
do we mean when we say our societies are ‘mediated’, and what are the long-term 
implications of this for their distribution of power? The question, if in different 
language, can be traced back to Lazarsfeld and Merton’s classic essay ‘Mass 
Communication, Popular Taste and Organised Social Action’ (1969) [1948]; it 
consolidates James Carey’s later and better-known call for more attention to the 
‘ritual mode of communication’ (1989). The radical nature of this shift, however, has 
largely been obscured by a particular reading of such questions, including the ‘ritual’ 
dimensions of media processes, within an all-too-comfortable functionalist 
understanding of how contemporary societies hold together, if they do. In this chapter, 
I want to show what it means to think about mediation beyond a functionalist 
framework.  
 
The term ‘ritual’ inevitably brings with it the contested  legacy of anthropology and 
the sociology of religion. In particular, it summons the highly ambiguous figure of 
Emile Durkheim: ambiguous because his ideas spanned the most urgent questions of 
contemporary sociology and an ‘armchair anthropology’ (Pickering, 1984) that seems 
rather quaint to us now; ambiguous also because the implications of Durkheim’s 
analysis of the social bond (and its grounding in ritual forms) for our understanding of 
power are quite uncertain. Carey was right to be uneasy about the Durkheimian 
legacy, but wrong (as Eric Rothenbuhler (1993) pointed out) to suggest that he could 
or did work outside it. The way forward, rather, must lie through more (and more 
rigorous) examination of anthropological theory in media research, not less. While the 
blindness of most media researchers to anthropology has been noted before (Elliott, 
1982; Dayan and Katz, 1992), the vision of anthropological theory that has so far been 
offered to media research is partial to say the least. It has foregounded the 
functionalist aspects of Durkheim and the related work of Victor Turner, ignoring 
many other promising paths: for example, Maurice Bloch’s (1989) work on ritual and 
power, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) reinterpretation of Durkheim and the study of media-
making as a social process in contemporary cultural anthropology (see Ginsburg, 
1994). Even less attention has been given to exciting recent work on ritual by 
anthropologists of religion (Smith, 1987; Bell, 1992, 1997; cf also Handelman, 1998). 
Once these new connections are opened up, other connections with social theory 
become possible, for example to the work of Foucault on ‘rituals of confession’ and 
governmentality (although I will not have space to pursue these here). The result, I 
believe, is to enrich media theory considerably and, perhaps, to contribute something 
to anthropological theory as well.  
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Before I go any further, let me get one definitional point out of the way. By media, I 
will mean not any media, or process of mediation, but particularly those central media 
(primarily television, radio and the press, but sometimes film and music, and 
increasingly also computer-mediated communication via the Internet) through which 
we imagine ourselves to be connected to the social world. This is the common sense 
notion of ‘the media’, although in the age of media digitalisation its precise reference-
point is changing to some degree. The media (in this sense) are involved in what I will 
call ‘the myth of the mediated centre’: the belief, or assumption, that there is a centre 
to the social world, and that, in some sense, the media speak ‘for’ that centre. This 
myth underlies our orientation to television, radio and the press (and increasingly the 
Internet), and our tendency to regard the massive concentration of symbolic power in 
those media institutions as legitimate. Symbolic power (if concentrated in this way) is 
a socially sanctioned ‘power of constructing reality’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 166), and the 
practices I will call ‘media rituals’ draw upon and, in turn, reinforce the assumed 
legitimacy of the media’s own concentration of symbolic power. 
 
I will be working here both with and against our instinctive sense of what the term 
‘ritual’ means. I want to rethink common sense notions of ‘ritual’ in order to address 
the complexity of contemporary media’s impacts on social space. Understanding 
‘media rituals’ is not simply a matter of isolating particular performances (‘rituals’) 
and interpreting them; it is a matter of grasping the whole social space within which 
anything like ‘ritual’ in relation to media becomes possible. The result is to enrich, but 
certainly not simplify, our account of ritual; this chapter presents merely some 
extracts from a longer, more detailed argument (see Couldry, 2003).  
 
Why We Still Need the Term ‘Ritual’ 
 
To introduce the term ‘ritual’ to the study of media requires some defence (cf Corner, 
1998). It is as well to note at the outset how the term has been used by 
anthropologists.  
 
There have been three broad approaches to ‘ritual’ in anthropology.  These have 
understood ‘ritual’ respectively as (a) habitual action, (b) formalised action, and (c) 
action involving transcendent values. The first definition is uninteresting as it is 
unclear what ‘ritual’ here adds to the idea of regular action or habit; I won’t pursue 
this further. The second and third approaches are more interesting. Formalised action 
is more than habit, since it insists that ‘ritual’ involves a pattern, form or shape, which 
gives meaning to that action. To see ‘ritual’ from the third perspective – as action 
involving or embodying broad, even transcendent, values – is compatible with the 
second approach, but shifts the emphasis away from questions of pure form and 
towards the particular values that ritual action embodies. It is the second and third 
senses of the term ‘ritual’ in which I am interested in this chapter. 
 
Immediately, however, there is an objection to retaining a term such as ‘ritual’ in 
contemporary cultural analysis. Doesn’t it fly in the face of many claims that we live 
in an age of ‘de-traditionalisation’ (Heelas, Lash and Morris, 1994) without anything 
so formalised as ‘ritual’, except as relics of the past? Doesn’t it ignore, specifically, 
the progressive multiplication and diversification of media outputs and media 
technologies in an age of media ‘plenty’ (Ellis, 2000)?  
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Behind this objection is a rather unhistorical assumption, that ‘ritual’ including ritual 
in the media field, is simply a matter of preserving past forms such as religious ritual. 
Why ignore the possibility, however, that new forms of ritual may be being generated 
right now, perhaps especially through the media’s operations? Ritual, I want to argue, 
remains an important term for grasping what media do and how social institutions 
work. Just as ritualised action turns our attention to ‘something else’, a wider, 
transcendent pattern ‘over and above’ the details of actions,3 raising questions of 
form, so too it is the media’s influence on the forms of contemporary social life  - the 
transcendent patterns within which the details of social life make sense - that is 
puzzling, and which I intend to capture by the term ‘media rituals’. ‘Media rituals’, in 
broad terms, refers to the whole range of situations where media themselves ‘stand in’ 
for something wider, something to do with the fundamental organisational level on 
which we are, or imagine ourselves to be, connected as members of a society. This 
can cover a range of situations: media events, pilgrimages at media sites, the media’s 
claims to represent ‘reality’ as in ‘reality TV’, and media sites for individuals to make 
public disclosures of private aspects of their lives (talk shows): see Couldry (2003).  
 
There is a greater flexibility to the term ‘ritual’ than is often realised. ‘Ritual’ has 
often been associated with claims that it produces, or maintains, social integration. 
This is a reading associated particularly with the tradition of social thought derived 
from the great French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, or at least one reading of 
Durkheim. But there are other interpretations of ritual. Anthropological theorists such 
as Maurice Bloch and Pierre Bourdieu have connected ritual not with the affirmation 
of what we share in common (the affirmation of real ‘community’), but with the 
management of conflict and the masking of social inequality. Unfortunately in media 
analysis, whenever ‘ritual’ has been introduced, it is the first, ‘integrationist’, 
understanding of ‘ritual that has dominated – and it is precisely this association of 
ritual with social integration and with the standard ‘integrationist’ reading of 
Durkheim that we need to challenge.  
 
Instead we need to rethink ‘ritual’, and particularly ‘media ritual’, to make room for 
new connections: between the power of contemporary media institutions and modern 
forms of government (Giddens, 1985). For too long, media theorists have analysed the 
most dramatic examples of media power (the great media events of televised 
coronations and state funerals) in isolation from questions of government. As Armand 
Mattelart (1994) argues, the result is an impoverished account of the media’s role in 
modernity, and therefore a misreading of media’s ambiguous contribution to the ritual 
dimension of modernity, including late modernity. 
 
Implied in my approach, unavoidably, is a wider perspective on how media contribute 
to contemporary societies’ holding together, if in fact they do. The approach I take to 
‘media rituals’ will be post-Durkheimian and anti-functionalist. These terms require 
some explanation. To be ‘post-Durkheimian’ is not to abandon Durkheim’s social 
theory as a reference-point, but to rethink our relation to Durkheim in a radical 
fashion, by dropping any assumptions that underlying and motivating ritual is always 
the achievement of social order. To be ‘anti-functionalist’ generalises the first point; it 
means opposing any form of essentialist thinking about society, not only functionalist 
accounts of society’s workings (and media’s role in them) but also the idea that 
society is essentially disordered and chaotic (indeed it is a rejection of any notion of 
social order that prevents some postmodern social theorists from seeing how much 
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Durkheim still has to offer in explaining contemporary media rhetorics, once we work 
outside functionalist assumptions). The point therefore (and here there is a clear 
difference with postmodern social theory: for example, Lash 2002: 215) is not that 
Durkheim is fundamentally wrong or outmoded in his prioritisation of ritual, sacred/ 
profane and other related ideas, but that, in order to grasp the continuing power of 
Durkheim’s ideas, we must discard the functionalist framework which shaped his 
work and think the question of social order (and its construction) from a new 
perspective. 
 
The Durkheimian Legacy 
 
Durkheim’s sociology of religion (especially in The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life, 1995 [1912]) is the unavoidable reference-point for any account of ritual that is 
interested in wider questions of social order. It was Durkheim who insisted on the 
need to grasp the dimension of social life that transcends the everyday. He called this 
‘the serious life’, la vie sérieuse (cf Rothenbuhler, 1998: 12-13, 25) and saw religion 
as its main, although not its only, manifestation. Durkheim, however, understood 
religion in a rather special sense. For him religion: 
 
is first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine the 
society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate relations they have 
with it. (1995: 227)  
 
Religion, then, for Durkheim is not about cosmic order (its usual reference-point), but 
about the way social beings imagine the social bond that they share as members of a 
group. Durkheim argued that our experiences of being connected as members of a 
social world are at the root of our most important categorisations of that world; they 
are at the root in particular of the sacred/profane distinction, which Durkheim argues 
underlies all religion in the usual sense of the term.  
 
This argument can be broken down into three stages:4  
 
1. At certain key times, we experience ourselves explicitly as social beings, as 
members of a shared social whole; 
2. What we do in those moments, at least in Durkheim’s imagined Aboriginal case, 
is focussed upon certain shared objects of attention, such as totems, and certain 
rituals which confirm the meaning of these ‘sacred’ objects or protect them from 
the ‘profane’; 
3. The distinctions around which those moments of shared experience are organised 
– above all, the distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ – generate the most 
important categorisations through which social life is organised. This, in 
Durkheim’s view, explains the social origin of religion and religious behaviour, 
and the centrality of the sacred/profane distinction in social life.   
 
Needless to say, in seeking to draw insights from Durkheim’s argument, I am not 
making claims here about the sociology of religion. If this seems cavalier on the face 
of it, it is justified by the breadth of implication built into Durkheim’s original 
argument (cf Lukes, 1973: 484). Paradoxically, Durkheim’s insights, although 
projected back into the past, were in fact directed at an urgent question for 
contemporary sociology: how, if at all, do societies cohere? More specifically: are 
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there certain central categories through which we perceive the social world, and what 
is their origin? These questions are as relevant to contemporary media as they are to 
contemporary religion. 
 
I am of course not the first to seek to apply Durkheim’s argument about religion in 
this way. Since the late 1970s, there have been a number of approaches that elsewhere 
I call ‘neo-Durkheimian’ (Couldry, 2003: 61), notably Dayan and Katz’s (1992) 
famous thesis on media events. There is not the space here to explore these arguments 
in detail. Instead I want to emphasise that  neo-Durkheimian arguments have a great 
asset: unlike many other approaches to the media, they take seriously our sense that 
much more is at stake in our relationship to the media than just distracted forms of 
image consumption. They share a concern to address the ‘excessive’ dimension of the 
media’s social impacts, but they also diverge from my argument in a crucial way. 
What is distinctive about the ‘post-Durkheimian’ use of Durkheim that I propose is its 
emphasis not on any real social basis for media’s integrative social role, but instead 
on the process of social construction that underlies the apparent fit of ritual analysis to 
modern societies of Durkheimian (or neo-Durkheimian) analyses, and particularly 
their media aspects.  
 
We are not in fact gathered together by contemporary media in the way neo-
Durkheimian arguments suggest. Even in the most dramatic cases of media events, 
this is only an approximation; in most others it is purely a ‘conventional expectation’ 
(Saenz, 1994: 576). On the contrary, I want to argue, we can only explain the ritual 
dimensions of media if we operate without mystifying functionalist assumptions. This 
means reading Durkheim against the grain, or at least against the grain of his most 
influential interpreters.  
 
From this perspective Durkheim’s concerns with social order are important, but as 
tools to prise open (rather than take at face value) contemporary claims, especially 
media claims, to represent social cohesion. Helpful here is Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991: 
166) reinterpretation of Durkheim as a thinker whose interest in social categories was 
based not on the assumption that they embody something ‘universal’ about the human 
mind or social fabric, but on the belief that the claims to universality inherent in such 
categories are a fundamental, and highly political, dimension of our contested social 
‘orders’. Far from assuming that contemporary mediated societies do hold together 
(with the help of media or otherwise) – a dangerous assumption (Lukes, 1975) – we 
should see the very idea of ‘social order’, mobilised in claims that rituals ‘integrate’ 
societies, as the result of a constant production (Hall, 1977: 340).  
 
This might sound, at first blush, like another version of the very functionalism I am 
claiming to move beyond; but in fact it is quite different. There is nothing 
functionalist about taking the media’s claims to have a function very seriously, not for 
their truth, but for their rhetorical and indeed social effects. Far from believing in a 
stable self-reproducing social macro-structure underlying these claims, we are simply 
recognising (as the anthropologist Don Handelman suggests) that social networks 
have: 
 
media through which members communicate to themselves in concert about the 
characters of their collectivities, as if these do constitute entities that are 
temporarily coherent. (Handelman, 1998: 15)  
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In contemporary societies dominated by media forms, the rhetorical pressures to 
believe in such ‘convergences’ are particuarly great. To the extent that ‘everything 
works as if’5 there was a functioning social whole, media, and media rituals, are 
central to that construction. This is why we need to study them.  
 
What and Where are Media Rituals?  
 
A non-functionalist approach to rituals (including media rituals) is less interested in 
them for themselves - as expressions of this or that idea - than in the wider social 
processes of ‘ritualization’. through which something like (media) ritual comes into 
being at all. The term ‘ritualization’ connects with a shift in thinking about ritual in 
recent anthropology of religion, especially the work of Catherine Bell (1992, 1997), 
who draws not only on Durkheim but on Bourdieu and Foucault.  ‘Ritualization’ 
encourages us to look at the links between ritual actions and wider social space, and in 
particular at the practices, beliefs and categories,6 found right across social life, that 
make specific ritual actions possible. In this section, I want to develop this idea both 
in terms of ritual in general and in terms of media rituals in particular. 
 
The emphasis in ritual analysis needs to shift away from questions of meaning and 
towards questions of power.7 Power is intertwined with the very possibility of 
contemporary ritual; similarly ‘media power’ (by which I mean: the particular 
concentration of symbolic power in media institutions)8 is intertwined with the very 
possibility of media rituals. But how exactly can we understand this link, and where is 
it made? Since power, following Foucault and many others, is not just in one place, 
but dispersed across social space, the link cannot occur just through the workings of 
those exceptional moments we call ‘ritual’. The link between ritual and power must 
be more regular, more embedded in everyday practice that that. We need a concept 
(absent from Durkheim)of the wider social space where ritual is generated. It is there 
that key categories are generated so that they can be drawn upon in the formalised 
distinctions of ritual performance. I call this space the space of ritualisation (cf Bell, 
1992).  
 
What space might this be? I use the word ‘space’ here metaphorically, as a convenient 
term to refer to the whole interlocking mass of practices that must be ‘in place’ for 
there to be ritual action oriented to the media. In complex societies, the tightly defined 
contexts of formal ritual (religious ritual, and equally media ritual) are relatively rare: 
this is why theories of de-traditionalisation appear to make the persistence of ritual 
implausible.  It is better however to think of the ritual process as stretched across 
multiple sites, indeed across social space as a whole (cf Silverstone, 1981: 66-67). We 
can expect that wider landscape of ritualisation to be highly uneven in terms of its 
power relations. In the media case, that space is formed around one central inequality  
- the historic concentration of symbolic power in media institutions – an equality 
which is naturalised through many detailed patterns, particularly the categories (such 
as those of ‘media’ and ‘ordinary’ person, of ‘liveness’, and so on: cf Couldry, 2000: 
42-52)  through which we understand our actions and orientations in relation to the 
media. Without this wider landscape, the patterned actions I will call ‘media rituals’ 
(to be clarified shortly!) would not make sense.  
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Studying media rituals in this non-functionalist way is the opposite of isolating 
particular moments and elevating them to special, even ‘magical’, significance. On 
the contrary, it means tracing the antecedents of media rituals in the patterns, 
categories and boundaries at work everywhere, from press and magazine comment to 
television newscasts to our everyday talk about celebrities, to the way we act when we 
go on television. Behind the patterns, however, lies the construction of an assumed 
value: the transcendental ‘value’ associated with ‘the media’ based on  their presumed 
ability to represent the social whole. My emphasis on ‘categories’, which is 
Durkheimian in spirit, might seem strange. In complex social worlds, with so many 
contradictory belief-systems, can there really be any central categories that have a 
privileged relationship to social order, or what passes for it? Paradoxically there can, 
and a striking feature of contemporary media and media rituals is precisely the way 
they make natural (against all the odds) the idea that society is centred, and the related 
idea that some media-related categories (‘reality’, ‘liveness’, ‘media person’, and so 
on) are of overriding importance. This is the paradox of the media’s social role in late 
modernity, an age when the real basis of myth (in a unified social community) is less 
plausible than ever before, yet the apparent basis of myth is more actively worked 
upon and constructed than ever before.  
 
To retain the term ‘ritual’ in this way, however, means resisting some powerful 
sceptics who have attacked the vagueness of the term in anthropology (Goody, 1977) 
and in media studies (Corner, 1999; Becker, 1998). All the more of a problem, you 
might think, when we qualify the notion of ritual so extensively as I have here. So let 
me be more specific about how I am using the term ‘ritual’ in relation to media.   
 
Media rituals (in the sense I am using the term) are actions which are capable of 
standing in for wider values and frameworks of understanding connected with the 
media. This connection works as follows: 
 
(i) the formalised actions comprising media rituals are structured around certain 
media-related categories ; 
(ii) those categories (themselves, as already mentioned, reproduced much more 
widely across the whole ritual space of the media) encode, or stand in for, an 
underlying ‘value’ associated with the media; and  
(iii) this ‘value’ is the sense that media themselves represent the social itself (they 
are our ‘natural’ access-point to social space).  
 
An example would be the organisation of ritualised meetings with celebrities around 
the distinction between the ‘media person’ (or celebrity) and the ‘ordinary person’. 
The wider resonance, or framing, of such acts derives from the way that the media 
person/ ordinary person distinction replicates a broader hierarchy between people/ 
things/ places ‘in’ the media over people/ things/ places not ‘in’ the media; this 
naturalised hierarchy, in turn, helps reinforce the special status of media themselves. 
This is what underlies, for example, the common reading of celebrities and their 
stories as if they stood for something more, something central about contemporary 
social life. 
 
Media rituals, then, like all rituals, do not so much express order, as naturalise it. They 
formalise categories, and the differences or boundaries between categories, in 
performances that help them seem natural, even legitimate; in this case, the 
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boundaries and category differences on which the apparently ‘natural’ social 
legitimacy of media institutions is based (cf Couldry, 2000). This way of thinking 
about the relations between ritual and power is, of course, very much at odds with the 
implications of traditional Durkheimian readings of ritual. I am drawing instead on 
Pierre Bourdieu’s radical revision of Durkheimian notions of ritual in his article ‘Rites 
of Institution’ (Bourdieu, 1991). The ritual dimension, for Bourdieu, of the classic rite 
of passage (from boy to man)  lies not in affirming community via the expression of 
certain transcendental values, but in naturalising the arbitrary boundaries on which the 
very possibility of the rite of passage depends: that is, the assumption that the 
male/female distinction (which divides in advance those who can undergo the rite of 
passage and those who can’t) is socially central (1991: 117-118). For Bourdieu, rituals 
are ‘rites of institution’, which institute as natural, and seemingly legitimate, certain 
key category differences and boundaries (for a fuller discussion, see Couldry, 2003: 
27-28).  
 
In developing this post-Durkheimian account of ritual, and media rituals, there are 
other links to areas of anthropological theory not usually associated at all with the 
Durkheimian tradition. Ritual appears to be both necessary and open to individual 
appropriation and reflection, since every ritual performance is always only a rough 
approximation to some imagined form. This potentially puzzling aspect of ritual is at 
the root of Maurice Bloch’s analysis.  Maurice Bloch (turning usual approaches to 
ritual on their head in a way that recalls Barthes’ (1972) notion of myth as a ‘turnstile’ 
that alternates continually between ‘reality’ and ‘myth’) argues that this very 
ambiguity of ritual is central to its effectiveness (Bloch, 1989: 130). It is rituals’ 
oscillation between timeless history and contingent adaptation that allows us to 
believe in their overriding ‘truth’. It is precisely this type of ambiguity that we need to 
grasp in understanding some well-known contemporary ritual forms, for example 
reality game-shows like Big Brother (Couldry, 2002).   
 
This argument is not however an attempt to reinstall ‘ideology’ in media analysis 
through the back door. The relationship between rituals and belief is a complex one, 
far from any simple notion that ritual action ‘expresses’ ideological contents which 
are explicitly believed. Clearly, in the media case there is no such explicit media 
‘credo’ (even if someone claimed there was one, it would be quickly disavowed as 
such), but this does not contradict the idea that the media’s authority depends on the 
incessant work through which the categories underlying media rituals are reproduced.  
 
The Media’s Ritual Categories 
 
In this section I want to explain more fully what are the categories of thought at play 
in media rituals, and so complete my account of what we can mean by the term 
‘media rituals in a non-functionalist framework. For convenience, let’s call these 
categories ‘the media’s ritual categories’. What are they? First, and most important, 
the basic category difference between anything ‘in’ or ‘on’ or associated with ‘the 
media’, and anything which is not. There is no type of thing in principle to which this 
difference can not apply; that is what it means to say that it is a category difference. 
Like Durkheim’s distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, it cuts across everything 
in the social world; anything can be ‘in’ the media. The ‘difference’ between what is 
‘in’ and not ‘in’ the media is therefore not natural, but a difference which, through 
continual usage, is constructed as natural (cf Couldry, 2000: 41).  
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We can observe ourselves and others constructing, as different, things, events, people, 
places or worlds ‘in’ the media. We see this in the construction of particular events as 
‘media events’, or in the construction of specific media places, as places of 
‘pilgrimage’, and in the category differences that get drawn between media people 
and non-media people, in the construction of celebrities, stars and ‘personalities’.  
 
So far we have looked at the category difference, and hierarchy, between what is in 
the media and what is not. This is the primary distinction through which the myth of 
the mediated centre is naturalised. But there are important secondary differences as 
well; these derive from the assumption that what is ‘in’ the media must have higher 
status than what is not, but are distinct in their reference-point. For example, the term 
‘liveness’ derives from the status of what is presented in the media, but suggests a 
little more explicitly that the reason media things matter more is because they are part 
of society’s current ‘reality’. That ‘reality’ is changing from moment to moment, as 
media coverage changes, which means that whatever is being shown now must, 
relatively, have a higher status than what is no longer being shown: hence the status of 
live transmission. Even more explicit, but still naturalised, are the distinctions drawn 
between the ‘reality’ of the different things media present: the debates about ‘reality 
TV’, or the pursuit of the ‘really real’ moment of ‘true’ emotion in the televised talk 
show (cf Couldry, 2003, chs 6 and 7).  
 
The media’s ritual categories, like all important organising categories, are reproduced 
in countless different circumstances. It is these categories that in media rituals are 
worked upon and further naturalised through bodily performance. Once again, it is 
Bourdieu’s work on ritual that is particularly helpful in understanding this link 
(particuarly that part of Bourdieu’s work which draws on Durkheim’s close 
collaborator, Marcel Mauss). Ritual, Bourdieu argues, is not an abstract expression of 
an idea, but instead a pattern of thought realised through embodies performance; ritual 
enactment is inseparable from the ‘practical mastery’ of the ritual agent who has 
internalised the key distinctions and categories on which the ritual is based  
(Bourdieu, 1977: 87-95, discussed by Bell, 1992: 107-108).  
 
The anthropologist of religion Catherine Bell has usefully developed these ideas to 
argue that it is such practical mastery that is the end-point of religious ritualisation, 
‘the body invested with a “sense” of ritual’ (1992: 98). Our sense of ritual - of certain 
forms of action as having heightened significance - is one way in which broad 
hierarchies are reinforced through the details of local performance. In this way ritual 
performance suggests a ‘higher’ order of things:  
 
Fundamental to all strategies of ritualization . . . is the appeal to a more embracing 
authoritative order that lies beyond the immediate situation. Ritualization is 
generally a way of engaging some wide consensus that those acting [in ritual] are 
doing so as a type of natural response to a world conceived and interpreted as 
affected by forces that transcend it. (Bell 1997: 169) 
 
This notion of ritualisation is perfectly adapted, as already suggested, to help us 
understand media rituals and their deep hinterland in everyday media-oriented 
practice. 
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Now, at least, we are in a position to explain more specifically what types of action 
might count as media rituals. Let me first approach this through the types of places 
where we might look for media rituals (there are a number of possibilities, still little 
researched or studied): 
 
• Sites where people cross from the non-media ‘world’ into the media ‘world’, such 
as studios, or any place where filming or media production goes on 
• Sites where non-media people expect to encounter people (or things) in the media 
(for example, celebrities) 
• Moments where non-media people perform for the media, for example posing for 
a camera, even if this takes place in the course of action that is otherwise not 
formalised.  
 
In all these situations, people act out category differences that reproduce in condensed 
form the idea, or derivatives of the idea, that media are our ‘natural’ access point to 
society’s ‘centre’. What types of action might these be? Here are some examples: 
 
• people calling out as their presence ‘on air’ is acknowledged (the studio chat show 
host turns to them and asks them to clap, ‘show what they feel’);9 
• people either holding back, or rushing forward, at the sight of a celebrity; 
• people holding back before they enter a place connected with the media, so as to 
emphasise the boundary they cross by entering it; 
• performances by media people that acknowledge their own specialness before a 
crowd of non-media people; 
• performances by non-media people when they are in certain types of formalised 
media context, such as a talk show.  
 
How far, in any particular situation, mere ritualisation flips over into the formality of 
a full-blown media ritual is a matter of empirical detail. The key point to understand 
however is that the anti-functionalist notion of media rituals developed here spans 
both media rituals as such and the wider space of ritualisation that lies behind them 
and that sustains them. The concept of media ritual/ ritualisation therefore links in a 
single explanatory arc intense moments of personal media performance (someone 
revealing private truths before unknown millions on a talk show) and the everyday 
banality of a whole room turning round because a celebrity is thought to have entered 
the room. Both - and everything that lies between them - are part of how we live out 
as truth the ‘myth of the mediated centre’.10  
 
Conclusion 
 
The approach offered here aims to confound the conventional association of ‘ritual’ 
with the preservation of some assumed traditional social ‘order’. On the contrary, the 
complexities of this account  - and particularly its resolute anti-functionalism – are 
designed to address a paradox that is profoundly and even distinctively modern. This 
is a paradox of ambiguity. It was Henri Lefebvre who fixed on the ambiguity of 
everyday life in his writings in the early days of electronic media (Lefebvre, 1991: 
18): the ambiguity that comes from the way the private space of everyday life is 
already crossed by countless trajectories of power (the economy, political order, 
media narratives). So too in assessing the media’s wider social consequences, we 
cannot separate out our hopes, our myths, our moments of togetherness and personal 
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expression, on the one hand, or conflict, on the other hand, from the mediated social 
forms which they now, almost always, take, and the uneven power relations on which 
those forms are based. To understand this we need certainly a model of the media’s 
ritual dimensions, but one that has moved beyond any vestiges of functionalism.  
 
The result is to return to James Carey, but without either the functionalism or the 
neglect for questions of power which, because Carey attributed them to Durkheim, led 
him to deny the theoretical legacy he shared in common with Durkheim (cf 
Rothenbuhler, 1993). It was Carey who put the paradox and challenge of the media’s 
social impacts better than anyone else:  
 
reality is a scarce resource . . . the fundamental form of power is the power to 
define, allocate, and display that resource. (1989: 87) 
 
How can we doubt that the fundamental question about mediation is a question of 
power, the uneven distribution of the power to influence representations of social 
‘reality’? A post-Durkheimian view however holds onto Philip Elliott’s  insight in one 
of the first, but still one of the best, essays on media and ritual: ‘ritual . . . is a 
structured performance in which not all participants are equal’ (Elliott, 1980: 145).  
So too, inevitably, are even the most apparently unifying moments of our media 
experience. That is the point of applying Durkheim’s insights to a world where all 
possibilities of ‘acting in common’11 are already mediated through social forms 
(media forms) that are inseparable from highly uneven effects of power.  
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1
 Cf most recently Gitlin (2002). 
2
 See Martin-Barbero (1993), Couldry (2000), Silverstone (forthcoming).  
3
 For example Myerhoff (1977: 199), Lewis (1980: 25), Douglas (1984: 63-64), Smith (1987: 109-
110), Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994: 88-89), Rappaport (1999: 24). Cf also Carey (1989: 21) and  
Rothenbuhler (1998: 57) in media theory.  
4
 For more detail, see Couldry (2000: chapters 1 and 3) drawing on Durkheim (1995). 
5
 Cf Bourdieu (1977: 203 n49). 
6
 See Bell (1992, 1997); Asad (1993: 87-79); Handelman (1998: x) and above all Bourdieu (1977, 
1990, 1991). Cf in media studies Saenz (1994: 584).  
7
 See Bourdieu (1991); Asad (1993: 53); Bell (1997: 81-2), Elliott (1982: 145), Bloch (1989).  
8
 See Couldry (2000, chapter 1). 
9
 This is one aspect of Karin Becker’s excellent article (1995), which perhaps comes closest to the 
approach developed here. 
10
 See Couldry 2003, chapter 3, for more discussion. 
11
 I am referring here to Durkheim’s fundamental claim that ‘society can only feel its influence in 
action, and [society] is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled and act in 
common’ (Durkheim, 1995: 421, emphases added, discussed Stedman Jones, 2001: 214). 
